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Cheap Debt Comes Due: CRE Refinancing and Bankruptcy

Writer: Kenneth D'Anna
Kenneth D'Anna
20 hours ago
3 min read

Concept illustration of commercial buildings lining a city avenue at sunset.

How maturing CRE loans can push owners toward bankruptcy.

Cheap debt can hide problems in a property's operations and in the way a deal is put together. Too much leverage, thin reserves, and optimistic rent assumptions can leave owners exposed when it is time to refinance. Inexperience can make these mistakes worse, but experienced firms are vulnerable too.

Even experienced sponsors face refinancing pressure

A Blackstone-sponsored CMBS loan originally totaling $1.3 billion entered special servicing after missing its October 2026 maturity date, according to reporting citing Morningstar Credit. Its remaining balance was approximately $517.7 million.

The refinancing gap is the pressure point

A substantial volume of commercial real estate debt is coming due. When a replacement loan will not cover the balance on the existing mortgage, the owner has to find a way to make up the difference. That may mean raising capital, selling the property, negotiating a workout with the lender, or seeking a restructuring through bankruptcy.

Consider a property purchased for $20 million with a $14 million interest-only mortgage. Assume its value falls to $16 million and a new lender is willing to lend 65% of that value. The new loan would be $10.4 million. The owner still owes $14 million, leaving a $3.6 million gap before fees and reserves.

Now consider the interest expense. On that same hypothetical $14 million loan, moving from 4% to 7% increases annual interest from $560,000 to $980,000. That is another $420,000 a year the property has to support.

The scale of the refinancing reset

The 10-year Treasury averaged 1.84% in 2016, compared with 4.46% for January through September 2026, calculated from the monthly averages. September averaged 4.99%. The federal funds target range was 3.75% to 4.00% as of October 24. These are benchmarks; an owner's mortgage rate also depends on lender spreads and loan terms. Ten-year loans taken out in 2016 may now be coming due, unless they have been refinanced or modified.

10-year Treasury yields: annual averages from 1.84% in 2016 to 4.29% in 2025; the January through September 2026 mean of monthly averages is 4.46%.

Newmark, citing MBA, described the $957 billion scheduled to mature in 2025 as a record forecast. Business bankruptcy filings totaled 26,941 in the year ending June 30, 2026, up 16.9% year over year. That bankruptcy figure covers all industries and chapters, so it does not tell us how many filings came from maturing CRE loans.

Scheduled commercial and multifamily loan maturities were $729 billion for 2023, $929 billion for 2024, $957 billion for 2025, and $875 billion for 2026. Business bankruptcy filings across all industries were 18,926 in 2023, 23,107 in 2024, 24,737 in 2025, and 26,941 for the 12 months ending June 30, 2026. These different series and periods do not establish causation.

From maturity to bankruptcy, and then to resolution

The repayment shortfall is where the problem becomes immediate. If the owner cannot refinance, sell, or contribute enough equity to repay the mortgage, failure to pay at maturity can trigger a default and, in some cases, a bankruptcy filing. Trepp reported maturity-related delinquencies in August 2026.

This can take years to work through. Extensions and negotiations with lenders may postpone a filing. Once a bankruptcy is filed, the automatic stay generally pauses collection and foreclosure, subject to exceptions and court relief. Some restructurings or property sales could run into 2028 or even 2029. Will delaying help if owners are counting on lower interest rates?

How long will the pressure last?

My concern is how long this pressure continues after the maturity peak. Will it remain manageable, or develop into a broader crisis? The residential mortgage crisis of 2008 and 2009 showed the risks of leverage. These figures alone do not tell us that we are heading for a similar collapse.

At Shore Acres Capital, we are watching Treasury yields, refinancing conditions, and bankruptcy filings closely. Even as annual maturities decline, owners may still be working through older loans while new ones come due. For the owner, it still comes down to whether the property can support the debt that replaces the original loan.


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